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 ABSTRACT 
 
Through a dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of Nordic firms we investigate how 
executives’ stock and option incentives influence the choice of capital structure. In addition, 
we look at how equity ownership by a large external shareholder influences the incentives’ 
effect on capital structure. Our results show that options have a negative effect on debt level, 
while stock holdings’ influence is more diffuse. We also see that only options have both a 
statistical and economical significant impact on leverage, and therefore operate as a 
stronger incentive than stocks. No significant dependency is found between the size of the 
largest external shareholder and the incentives’ effect on capital structure. Still, we see a 
weak trend indicating that the effect of equity based incentives is stronger when firms’ 
largest shareholders are institutional. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E-mail addresses: mariell.kversoy@gmail.com (Mariell Kversøy Birkeland), 
      aneeidem@gmail.com (Ane Eidem Eriksen), ellenueland@gmail.com (Ellen Ueland).  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the work of Berle and Means (1932), researchers have acknowledged the potential 
conflicts of interest between executives and shareholders. Capital structure can be used by 
shareholders in order to limit this agency problem, or executives might adjust capital 
structure according to their own preferences. Jensen & Meckling (1976) showed that debt 
financing, even in the absence of taxes, increases firm value due to reduced total agency 
costs. A diversified external shareholder will therefore choose a level of debt that minimizes 
these costs and thereby maximizes firm value. Nevertheless, Lang (1987) presented a theory 
illustrating that if executives lose all their interests in the firm at bankruptcy they may desire 
to use an amount of debt that is less than ideal from external shareholders’ point of view. 
This will result in a reduced firm value. Hence, from an agency theory perspective, it is 
argued that the separation of ownership and control makes it impossible to secure that 
executives make optimal decisions for the external shareholders, without incurring any 
agency costs. It is expected that as fractional ownership falls, equity agency costs surge due 
to the residual loss caused by executives maximizing their own wealth, and not the external 
shareholders’. From a risk oriented perspective, executives are unable to diversify their 
human capital. To secure their own positions they will therefore seek to reduce firms’ risk 
through under-leveraging. As the external shareholders bear these agency costs of equity, it 
is in their interest to minimize them. 
Various incentives are used to align executive interests with those of shareholders. 
Equity compensation is the most widely used incentive to obtain this. The underlying 
intention of such compensation is to expose executives to firm risk and encourage them to 
make financial decisions in the interest of the external shareholders. However, regarding 
capital structure, the incentives’ influential directions on leverage is somewhat diffuse. 
When allocating shares, the literature showcases two divergent results and explains these by 
focusing on two aspects: Executives’ risk aversion, which emphasizes executives preference 
to choose lower risk compared to well diversified external shareholders, and the agency cost 
of debt, which also consider how changes in the costs of debt affect executives’ financing 
preference.  
Friend and Lang (1988) based their empirical analysis on the risk aversion argument. To 
test whether capital structure decisions are, at least in part, motivated by executive 
ownership they classified New York Stock Exchange firms into two equal groups, one above- 
and one below-median ownership. This gave them an opportunity to examine whether 
executives’ ability and desire to reduce the level of debt are dependent on how much equity 
they possess. The coefficient of the ownership variable was larger in the sample with higher 
proportion of executive ownership, indicating that these executives have greater incentives 
to affect leverage. They also showed a negative relationship between executive ownership 
and debt level, and argued that this observation reflects the greater undiversified risk of 
debt to executives compared to diversified external shareholders. Firth (1995) agreed and 
emphasized that the greater fraction of ownership, the greater are executives’ abilities to 
adopt strategies to accomplish their own objectives. However, Mehran (1992) stated that 
the influential direction on leverage is more complex and therefore rather unclear. On one 
hand, debt increases share price and therefore higher debt may become more attractive as 
executive ownership increases. Notwithstanding, at sufficiently high levels of ownership, 
executives are unlikely to hold a well-diversified portfolio and they would therefore prefer 
lower levels of debt. The result he found through his article coincides with his first argument, 
   M.K.Birkeland, A.E.Eriksen, E. Ueland (2011) 
 
3 
 
which depicts a positive relationship. As this was conflicting evidence compared to earlier 
research, Mehran (1992) argued that different origins for the data collection could be the 
underlying cause. 
Short et al. (2002) argued that previous research ignores the part of the agency theory 
which concerns agency cost of debt. Based on this argument he explains the positive 
relationship between stock compensation and the debt level. As executives’ ownership give 
them incentives to decrease their disposition to risk, risk seeking behavior like engaging in 
asset substitution is likely to be reduced. Hence, the interests of executives are likely to 
become more aligned with those of the debt holders, lowering the agency cost of debt and 
therefore also the debt burden for the firm.  
The effect of executive stock options on capital structure seems not to have received as 
much attention in academic research as executive equity stock holdings. Smitt and Watts 
(1982) argued that stock options may motivate executives to increase the firms’ risk by for 
instance to take on more debt, since this further will increase the value of their options.  
Zhou (2001) agreed with this point of view, and stated that a substantial proportion of 
option compensation to executives can be associated with more extreme outcomes in stock 
prices compared to other equity compensation incentives. This is caused by the fact that 
executives might take higher risk than desirable because, when owning options, they are 
only exposed to upside risk. Thus, based on the risk aversion argument there is a positive 
relationship between options and debt level.  
When looking at how executive equity compensation influences the choice of capital 
structure, it is interesting to also consider how large external shareholders can affect the 
decision. Friend and Lang (1988) explored this by dividing each of the two, above-mentioned 
groups into two new groups, one with large and one with small external shareholders, using 
a cutoff of 10% ownership. They did not find any clear tendencies. Still, they argued that 
external shareholders are likely to hold more diversified portfolios than owner-executives 
and would, therefore, be expected to prefer higher debt levels than those sought by 
executives. Also Firth (1995) and Mehran (1992) found this positive relationship, and argued 
that a large external shareholder constrains executives’ discretion in setting capital 
structure. On the contrary, Short et al. (2002) argued that the presence of a large external 
shareholder may force executives to engage in asset substitution. Hence, increased risk 
changing behavior on the part of executives will increase the agency costs of debt, resulting 
in a negative relationship. Short (2002) also tested if the existence of a large external 
shareholder would change the incentives’ effect on leverage. He defined two different 
dummy variables in the regression model, each multiplied with the percentage of equity 
owned by the executive. The first dummy equaled one if the major shareholder was large, 
and the second dummy equaled one if the major shareholder was small. After carrying 
through this regression, Short concluded that the presence of a large external shareholder 
negate the positive relationship between executive ownership and debt ratio. 
Our analysis of the link between executive equity based incentives and leverage differs 
from previous work both in geographic focus and in methodology. Previous literature has 
focused on the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), while we look at the Nordic 
market. Our research also differs from former static studies by using panel data to conduct a 
dynamical analysis. Panel data accounts for individual heterogeneity, and reduce the chance 
for omitted variable bias. Hence, we believe using panel data makes our model more robust. 
To our knowledge, earlier research on the relationship between options and debt level has 
solely focused on the risk aversion argument. We therefore present a new theoretical 
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perspective for this relationship by also including the agency cost of debt as an influencing 
factor. When options are allocated, executives are willing to take on more risk by for 
instance to raise debt level, as this boosts the options’ value. In this case the firm specific risk 
will increase, which again will influence creditors to demand a higher interest on debt. In 
addition we investigate how each firm’s largest external shareholder influences the incentive 
variables’ effect on debt level. This is done because we expect that they have the possibility 
and interest of interfering in capital structure decisions. 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
methodology used and the collection of data. In section 3 we show the regression results 
and provide our interpretation of these. Section 4 presents robustness checks and potential 
sources of errors, before we conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. Methodology and Data  
 
In this section we first present our model for how executives’ equity incentives influence the 
choice of capital structure. After that follows an explanation of data sources, before we 
define the regression variables used in our model. 
 
2.1 Regression method 
 
We conducted a dynamic analysis, using panel data in STATA. This dynamical approach 
allowed us to introduce a new dimension compared to earlier static research. Leverage (LEV) 
was defined to be the dependent variable and our proxy for capital structure. Further we 
specified eight independent variables, four control variables (CV) and four incentive 
variables (IV), see Table 1 below. The following regression model was used: 
 
 
             
 
   
       
 
     
 
 
 
A constructed proxy never captures the full effect of the real world causal 
relationship between equity compensation and leverage. We therefore chose to define two 
different proxies that capture slightly different aspects of each of the two incentives, shares 
and options. This resulted in two main regressions, one for each of the two combinations of 
the incentives’ proxies (see Table 1). The motivation was to find stronger indicia for the 
relationship between incentives and capital structure, given that both regressions derived 
the same result.  
Our dataset, made out of 29 companies, constitute of a random sample drawn from 
the total number of listed companies. The variation across entities was therefore assumed to 
be random and uncorrelated with the other independent variables, which meant that we 
could use a random effects model. The Hausman test also supported this decision. Each 
company was listed during the time period 2005-2009. 
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Further, we expected a time effect in our dataset. This is because when executives 
receive incentives, they will normally not be able to alter the capital structure immediately. 
Yet, since we only registered financial data from firms once a year at year-end, the time 
trend was not expected to be large. This is because parts of the delays will be captured in 
the firms’ closing balance, if incentives were given early in that same year. To check if our 
intuition was right we did multiple test-regressions on our dataset where one, two and three 
lags on the incentive proxies were included. When using lags, it limits the number of years 
and thereby the number of observations included in the regression. By introducing one lag, 
values from 2005 were only included in the lagged values and not in the rest of the variables. 
With two lags, values from 2005 and 2006 were only included in the lagged values, and so 
on. Next we compared these lagged regressions with regressions done without lags on the 
same number of years, i.e. 2006 to 2009 for one lag, 2007 to 2009 for two lags etc. Doing 
this, we saw a time trend in our dataset, and thus, decided to introduce lags in our model to 
also incorporate the time effect that spans over multiple years1. To find the suitable number 
of lags we did regressions with one, two and three lags on the incentive variables. It turned 
out that using two lags on the OS and VO variables were sufficient. 
 To check for potential data dependency in our results, we further categorized our 
data into different subsamples and performed the same regression on these. To better see 
the combined incentives effect on leverage we regressed on a subsample which only 
included firms that allocate options (SUBO). The restriction on options was chosen because 
there are fewer firms in our dataset that allocate options than stocks. We also divided our 
dataset into two new subsamples, restricted by whether or not the largest external 
shareholder owned more (SUBEL) or less (SUBES) than 10 %2. The motivation for this 
classification was to see whether the existence of a large external shareholder contra a small 
external shareholder influenced the incentives’ effect on leverage differently. We further 
created two new subsamples, based on whether or not the firms’ largest shareholders were 
institutional (SUBEI) or private (SUBEP)3. Our aim was to determine if this categorization 
would change the incentives effect on leverage.  
 
2.2 Data sources and variables used in the regression model 
 
Data from 796 listed Nordic companies was collected from the Bloomberg and Amadeus 
databases for the period 2005-2009, and all variables in the model were calculated from 
reported year-end values. To ensure a fully balanced dataset, firms with low data availability 
were excluded, resulting in a final sample of 29 firms. Besides this, the final sample was 
selected randomly from listed Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and Finnish companies within 
one of the following four sectors4; industrials, consumer staples, information technology and 
materials. Companies from Iceland were excluded due to the country’s extraordinary 
financial situation recent years. Where it was found necessary, annual reports were used as 
                                                          
1
 See Appendix C.1 for further details. 
2
 This is the cutoff that Friend and Lang (1998) used in their paper to separate large major external 
shareholders from smaller. 
3
 Institutional shareholders are defined to have investment stakes in more than two industries and are well 
diversified. Remaining shareholders are classified as private shareholders and are less diversified. 
4
 Classified according to the GICS. 
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an additional source of information. After having completed the dataset we looked at the 
descriptive statistics and removed outliers5. 
To be able to assess the incentive variables’ isolated effect on leverage, we included 
four control variables. Three of these variables are commonly used in the literature to 
account for other potential determinants of capital structure, see Titman and Wessels 
(1988), Altman (1968) and Baker and Wurgler (2002)6. In addition, a forth control variable 
accounting for the ownership of the largest external shareholder was included. Table 1 
below gives an overview over the final variables we used in our regression model. For 
descriptive statistics see Table 2.  
In previous literature, both book and market values have been used to determine 
leverage ratios. Book values can be manipulated by accounting techniques that differs 
between firms, making them less comparable in cross-sectional analyses. But, since we in 
our analysis considered panel data, accounting differences between firms became less 
crucial. Marsh (1982) also argued that book values are preferable because these are the 
numbers executives tend to focus on when making capital structure decisions. We therefore 
used book values when calculating our dependent variable. Also, in the literature, both long-
term debt and total debt are used to determine leverage ratios. We expected that newly 
obtained executive incentives in most cases will have a delayed effect on leverage. 
Therefore, we saw long-term debt as a more appropriate variable to capture how present 
incentives affect firms’ long-term capital structure.  
Our main motive in the choice of incentive proxies was to find variables that in the 
best possible way would reflect how stocks and options given to executives affect leverage. 
The defined variables are SS (Stock Sensitivity) and VSTO (Value Stock) for the stock 
incentive, and OS (Option Sensitivity) and VO (Value Option) for the option incentive.  
The motivation behind our risk proxies, SS and OS, was our conviction that 
executives’ willingness to change personal risk exposure will affect their posture to leverage. 
Executives are exposed to firm specific risk when they are holding equity based 
compensation, since their wealth will be dependent on firm performance. When leverage 
increases, the asset and stock return volatility will also increase, meaning that SS and OS 
indirectly reflect how sensitive executives’ stock and option values are to changes in firms’ 
leverage. By measuring changes in executives’ stock and option values due to changes in 
firm specific risk, we capture an important aspect of the motivation incentives give 
executives to affect leverage.  
We defined the VSTO and VO proxies based on our opinion that the value of stocks 
and options incentives also affects executives’ motivation to change leverage. However, we 
realize that the actual motivation perceived of the executives that obtain these incentives is 
dependent of the value relative to their total monetary compensation. We therefore used 
the rate of executives’ stock and option wealth to total yearly monetary compensation to 
describe executives’ incentives to change leverage.  
Previous research frequently uses the percentage of executives’ ownership as a proxy 
for the stock incentive. This proxy can also give an indication of executives’ ability to change 
leverage, as a higher percentage of ownership gives more voting rights. When including this 
                                                          
5
 To discover outliers we plotted each year separately and removed firms that stood out in three or more years. 
6
 We tried several control variables that are common in the capital structure theory, and also different proxies 
for the same control variables. These three were retained because they were the most significant ones.   
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proxy (MANFRAC) in our regressions, it turned out to be insignificant and it was therefore 
dropped in further analysis.  
 
   Abbreviation Proxy for Definition 
Dependent 
variable 
 LEV Leverage Long-term debt/Book value of total asset 
Control 
variables 
 LNSALES Size LN(Sales) 
  EOA Profitability EBIT/Book value of total asset 
  GROWRD Growth 
opportunity 
R&D/Total sales 
  EXT External 
shareholder 
% ownership of the largest shareholder 
Incentive 
variables { 
SS
1
 Stock 
incentive 
SS=(e
-yT
*N'(d1)*S*√T)*Executive ownership fraction 
 OS
1
 Option 
incentive 
OS=(e
-yT
*N'(d1)*S*√T)*# Executive options 
 
{ 
VSTO
2
 Stock 
incentive 
Value executive stocks/yearly monetary compensation  
  VO
2
 Option 
incentive 
Value executive options/yearly monetary compensation  
Table 1: Two separate regressions were conducted: In regression 1, the proxies SS and OS were together with 
the control variables regressed on LEV. In regression 2, SS and OS were substituted by VSTO and VO. All 
variables are fractions, except LNSALES, SS and OS. SS and OS have units in Million NOK per percentage 
volatility change. 
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
In this section we first present the characteristics of our dataset followed by a review of our 
regression results. These results are then discussed and interpreted.  
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Summary statistics relating to the variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 2.  
Inspection of the table shows that the mean leverage in our sample is 16.4% and therefore 
relatively low compared to datasets in previous literature. The standard deviation of 
leverage is 18.2%. 
The mean of the SS proxy shows that the sensitivity of total stock value to asset 
volatility is 28.5 million NOK per percentage asset volatility change, with a standard 
deviation of 93.9. The comparable stock proxy, the fraction of executives’ stocks value to 
total, yearly monetary compensation (VSTO), has a mean of 6.5 and a standard deviation of 
23.6. We are looking at the wealth effect of executives’ stocks, accumulated over many 
Executive Incentives and Capital Structure 
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years, to the total monetary compensation received each year. The ratio can therefore 
exceed 1. 
Regarding the option proxies, the sensitivity of total option value to stock volatility 
(OS) has a mean of 7.9 million NOK per percentage stock volatility change, while the 
standard deviation is 24.4. The fraction of executives’ total option value to total, yearly 
monetary compensation (VO), gives a mean of 1.1 and a standard deviation of 3.1. 
The dummy variable (INSTPRIV) indicates if the largest external shareholder is 
institutional (1) or private (0). We see that the mean is 68.3%, which means that the 
overweight is institutional shareholders. We also see that the mean equity fraction held by 
managers (MANFRAC) is 3.4%, which indicates that executives in Nordic countries have low 
equity interests in their own firms. The largest external shareholders (EXT) hold on average 
24.6 % of the firms, which qualifies as a large proportion compared to dataset in earlier 
literature. 
From Table 2 we see that all incentive variables, except VO, have a large range, which 
can result in small coefficients when regressing. Still, these small coefficients can have an 
essential influence on leverage and we will therefore analyze them further.  
When considering that our dataset consists exclusively of Nordic listed firms of a 
certain age and credibility, the chances of financial distress are minimal. For that reason we 
further assume that executives, when facing the tender of lower (higher) cost of debt, will 
choose to adjust the firms debt level up (down). 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max Obs 
Debt ratio      
LEV 0.164 0.182 0.000 0.918 145 
      
Control variables      
LNSALES 8.578 1.842 4.188 12.181 145 
EOA 0.141 0.315 -0.237 1.796 145 
GROWRD 0.070 0.117 0.000 0.895 145 
EXT 0.246 0.156 0.032 0.930 145 
      
Incentive variables      
SS 28.536 93.903 0.000 808.991 145 
OS 7.876 24.417 0.000 247.845 145 
VSTO 6.481 23.619 0.000 235.178 145 
VO 1.082 3.097 0.000 23.630 145 
      
Other variables      
MANFRAC 0.034 0.079 0.000 0.395 145 
INSTPRIV 0.683 0.467 0.000 1.000 145 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in our regressions. Other Variables are not included in the 
model, but used in supplementary regressions. MANFRAC shows the fraction of how much shares executives 
possess, while the dummy variable INSTPRIV reviles whether external shareholders are institutional (=1) or 
private (=0). INSTPRIV is used to separate the whole sample into two subsamples. 
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3.2 Results 
 
The coefficients in Table 3 below reveal that most of the stock and option incentives do have 
a statistical significant impact on leverage. If we compare the absolute size of the incentive 
coefficients directly with the control variables coefficients, the impact may appear small. 
Nevertheless, without considering the impact in a larger context we cannot make any 
conclusions about this. Introducing lags generally improve our results and we will therefore 
only present the lagged models and do our analyses on these, unless specified differently in 
the text. 
Looking at the whole sample, SS is positively related to leverage, but not highly 
significant. VSTO, on the other hand, acts completely different from SS, being significant and 
negatively related to leverage. OS and VO are both significant and negatively related to 
leverage. The option coefficients in each of the two proxy combinations are about ten times 
higher than the stock coefficients. VO’s impact on leverage is about 10 times larger than the 
impact caused by OS. EXT’s coefficient is positive in this regression, but not significant.  
 
 Whole dataset SUBO Whole dataset SUBO 
LEV COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. 
LNSALES -0.0025 -0.0066 -0.0033 -0.0034 
 (0.878) (0.722) (0.840) (0.849) 
EOA 0.3845 -0.1838 0.3938 -0.2235 
 (0.000) (0.365) (0.000) (0.294) 
GROWRD 0.1336 -0.2122 0.1563 -0.3045 
 (0.386) (0.599) (0.306) (0.432) 
EXT 0.1327 -0.3394 0.0907 -0.2700 
 (0.321) (0.106) (0.495) (0.210) 
SS
1
 1.65E-04 2.3E-04   
 (0.133) (0.019)   
OS
1
 -0.0010 -0.0010   
 (0.008) (0.002)   
VSTO
2
   -0.0017 -0.0003 
   (0.063) (0.895) 
VO
2
   -0.0348 -0.0263 
    (0.001) (0.014) 
Table 3: Results from regressions done on the whole sample and on the subset where only firms that give 
option incentives to executives are included (SUBO).  Coefficients, with accompanying p-values in brackets, 
are provided for the different regressions. 
In the regression done on the subsample where only firms that allocate options are 
included (SUBO), SS’s coefficient increases, OS’s remains the same and both VSTO’s and VO’s 
decrease compared to the regression done on the whole sample. SS and OS obtain a clearly 
better p-value in SUBO, while VSTO becomes insignificant and VO less significant. EXT 
becomes negative, but is not highly significant. 
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When dividing the sample into two subsamples, one with large external shareholders 
(SUBEL) and one with small external shareholders (SUBES), we are not able to use lags in 
STATA due to a limited number of observations in the latter subsample. When regressing on 
these two subsamples the incentives’ p-values generally become high (see Table 4). We can 
therefore not say anything about how the existence of a large external shareholder 
influences the incentives’ effect on leverage. Still, EXT becomes significant and strongly 
negative when major external shareholders are small, and close to significant and positive 
when the opposite is true. 
When we regress on a subsample which includes only private external shareholders 
(SUBEP), we observe no significant relationship between the incentive variables and leverage 
(Table 4). Regressing on the opposite subset where only institutional external shareholders 
(SUBEI) are included, all incentive variables, except VO, obtain higher coefficients and get 
more significant compared to the whole sample.  
The control variables are not the focus in this paper, but it is still necessary to notify 
the direction in which they affect leverage and whether or not this is consistent across the 
different samples. LNSALES is both positive and negative, but it is only significant in SUBES, 
where it has a negative influence. EOA is positive in all samples where it is significant. 
GROWRD is only significant in SUBES, where it is negative. 
 
  SUBES SUBEL SUBES SUBEL SUBEP SUBEI SUBEP SUBEI 
LEV COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. 
LNSALES -0.0301 0.0068 -0.0263 0.0042 0.0146 -0.0143 0.0369 -0.0085 
 (0.032) (0.713) (0.090) (0.820) (0.797) (0.464) (0.348) (0.655) 
EOA 0.1008 0.1410 0.1837 0.1435 0.2809 0.4605 0.1381 0.4560 
 (0.819) (0.024) (0.719) (0.022) (0.146) (0.000) (0.335) (0.000) 
GROWRD -1.9149 0.1189 -1.6856 0.1071 -0.2032 0.1367 0.2509 0.1587 
 (0.000) (0.506) (0.000) (0.550) (0.633) (0.475) (0.567) (0.404) 
EXT -4.8356 0.1799 -5.4252 0.1789 0.0597 0.0692 0.3904 0.0585 
 (0.001) (0.199) (0.000) (0.207) (0.885) (0.680) (0.235) (0.723) 
SS
1
 1.58E-03 0.0002   -4.60E-06 0.0002   
 (0.353) (0.210)   (0.987) (0.073)   
OS
1
 0.0013 -0.0006   0.0012 -0.0010   
 (0.549) (0.127)   (0.851) (0.007)   
VSTO
2
   -0.0032 -0.0005   0.0016 -0.0021 
   (0.380) (0.331)   (0.514) (0.037) 
VO
2
   -0.0005 -0.0055   -0.0214 -0.0339 
    (0.905) (0.304)   (0.802) (0.002) 
Table 4: Results from regressions done on the following subsets: Firms with largest external shareholder's 
ownership below 10% (SUBES), firms with largest external shareholder's ownership abow 10% (SUBEL), firms 
where largest external shareholder is private (SUBEP),firms where the largest external shareholder is 
institutional (SUBEI). Coefficients, with accompanying p-values in brackets, are provided for the different 
regressions.  
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3.3 Discussion and interpretation of results 
 
In this section we present an interpretation of each of the two incentives’ effect on leverage. 
Further, we look at the external shareholders impact on the incentives. We also provide a 
comparison of the incentives, as well as a comparison of our results to previous research.  
 
3.3.1  Stock incentives’ effect on leverage 
 
The two stock proxies, SS and VSTO, are showing contradicting results, which makes it 
difficult to draw any clear conclusion about how the stock incentive influences leverage over 
time. This result is inconsistent with our assumption in Section 3.1, concerning that 
executives will choose to adjust firms’ debt level up when facing the tender of a lower cost 
of debt. The coefficient on SS in Table 3 is positive and, even though it is not statistically 
significant at a 10% confidence level, it can be argued that it has a small significant influence 
on leverage. VSTO, on the other hand, has a negative and significant coefficient. Due to 
these contradictory results, we do not analyze the quantitative effect of stock incentives on 
leverage any further. However, we want to make some reflections around the different 
influential directions. 
We can explain the divergent results from an agency theory perspective. According to 
this theory, shareholders’ first consideration when giving stock incentives is to align 
executives’ interests with their own, as this will reduce the agency cost of equity. At the 
same time, debt holders are of the opinion that executives’ stock ownership will make them 
less willing to take on risk, and that their interests, therefore, are likely to become more 
aligned with the debt holders. Thus, the agency cost of debt will probably also be reduced. 
Arguing that stock incentives result in both lower costs of equity and debt, the exact 
influential direction on leverage is somewhat diffuse, as seen in our results as well as 
previous research: SS’s result supports the evidence of Friend and Lang (1988) and Firth 
(1995), while VSTO’s result supports Mehran (1992) and Short et al. (2002). 
An interesting observation is that the total value of shares to total monetary 
compensation ratio (VSTO), becomes insignificant when regressing on a sample which only 
includes firms that allocates options (SUBO). In general, when one regress on a smaller 
sample, it is expected that the p-value will somewhat increase even though the true 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables remains the same. 
However, the p-value of VSTO is about 2.5 times higher in SUBO, a result that is above what 
we would expect from simply a change in sample size. Therefore, our opinion is that the 
option incentive exceeds the incentive created by the value of stocks, indicating that options 
are a stronger incentive. 
The sensitivity of total stock value to asset return volatility (SS) on the other hand, 
becomes highly significant in SUBO. This can be explained by looking at the company risk, as 
well as the fact that options are assumed to be a stronger incentive than stocks. When 
options are present, this will affect executives’ company risk preference positively, which 
again will affect the value of SS through changed asset return volatility. The direct 
dependency between SS and asset volatility might therefore explain why SS, as opposed to 
VSTO, becomes more significant in SUBO.  
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3.3.2  Option incentives effect on leverage 
 
From Table 3 we see that both of our option incentive proxies, OS and VO, have statistical 
significant and negative coefficients, which implies that option incentives have a negative 
effect on leverage over time. This coincides with our assumption presented in Section 3.1 
regarding that executives will adjust the firms’ debt level down when facing the tender of a 
higher cost of debt. Since VO has a larger and more significant coefficient, we also see that 
VO captures more of this effect than OS. This result is consistent through all regressions 
done, both on the whole sample and on subsamples. 
The coefficient on the sensitivity of total option value to stock return volatility 
variable (OS) of -0.001, indicates that an increase of 1 % in average OS equals a decline of 
0.05% of the average leverage ratio. Thus we conclude that OS have a limited economic 
impact on leverage. The coefficient of the total value of options to total monetary 
compensation ratio (VO) of -0.0348, indicates that an increase in the average VO ratio by 1% 
equals a decrease of 0.23% in average leverage. This qualifies to being called an 
economically significant dependency. 
Our results are inconsistent to those found by Smitt and Watts (1982) and Zhou 
(2001). They both find a positive relationship between options and leverage. To explain this 
contradiction we take agency theory into consideration. Shareholders give options to align 
the executives’ interests with their own, and thereby reduce the cost of equity. When 
receiving options executives obtain an incentive to increase firm risk as this will boost the 
value of their options. One way to achieve this is to increase leverage. In response to the 
allocated options, creditors will at the same time anticipate executives’ higher risk 
preference, and therefore increase the interest rates on debt. This works as an incentive to 
decrease leverage. Options have therefore two opposite effects on leverage. When we in 
our results observe a negative relationship between option incentives and leverage, we 
conclude that the reduction of total agency costs matter more than the possible gains from 
higher option values. 
The difference in economic significance of the option proxies can be explained by the 
fact that each of the two proxies captures different aspects of the option incentives’ 
influence on leverage. Seeing that VO has higher p-values, we conclude that this is the 
superior proxy. By being a better suiting proxy, VO captures the option incentives effect 
better than OS, which might also explain why VO has a larger coefficient. Another reason for 
why VO seems like a better proxy might be due to calculation simplifications of OS. These 
can lead to underestimation of the risk incentive associated with OS. The exercise prices 
used to calculate the options’ incentive effects are supposed to be the average exercise 
prices for all the options executives possess. Yet, where this information was unavailable, we 
used the average exercise prices reported for options exercised in the current period, 
meaning options in the money. This leads to underestimated exercise prices and hence 
overestimated option values. In consequence, we then underestimate the risk incentives 
executive possess when their options are assumed to be more into the money than they 
really are.  
 
3.3.3 A comparison between stocks’ and options’ effect on leverage  
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We see a general trend that options act as a stronger incentive to change leverage than 
stocks. By separately comparing the absolute value of the coefficients of SS with OS and 
VSTO with VO, the options’ coefficients are about 10 times higher and more significant. Also 
compared to the control variables, options are economical significant. 
That options act as a stronger incentive than stocks can be explained by the agency 
theory. According to this theory, equity clearly becomes the cheaper choice of new financing 
when executives are holding options, as the agency cost of equity goes down while the 
agency cost of debt goes up. For stocks the choice is less clear since both agency cost of 
equity and debt decrease, and it can therefore be expected that other factors will have a 
higher influence on stock incentives’ effect on leverage. This is seen in our results since 
stocks’ influence on leverage is more dependent on what sample we have regressed on, see 
Table 3.  
We classify options as an economical significant incentive. To evaluate if options’ 
effect remains economical significant relative to other influential factors, we compare VO’s 
coefficient to the earning over asset (EOA) coefficient. This is because EOA has the largest 
coefficient and is the only significant control variable in the whole sample. As the OS proxy is 
assessed to be economically insignificant, it is excluded in this comparison. EOA’s coefficient 
is about 10 times higher than VO’s (see Table 3), indicating that option incentives’ impact on 
leverage is relatively small compared to other factors. However, when analyzing VO’s and 
EOA’s average impact on leverage we actually see that options have a significant economic 
influence. If we increase the average EOA fraction by 1% this corresponds to an increase of 
0.3% in average leverage compared to VO’s change of 0.2% (see section 3.3.2). Therefore, 
the VO’s and EOA’s effect on leverage is similar in absolute terms. 
When comparing our overall results of stocks’ and options’ to those of earlier 
research, we notice that our observations coincide more with those of Short et al. (2002) 
than the other papers on the area. Since Short et al. (2002) is the only paper discussing a 
non-American dataset, namely the UK, this indicates that the tendencies we found in the 
Nordic market are more similar to tendencies observed in the UK. Considering that the UK is 
a closer market, and a capital commercial trade partner to the Nordic market, it is natural 
that there are stronger mutual influences between the two markets. 
 
3.3.4 Large external shareholders’ impact  
 
We cannot draw any conclusion regarding how the size of an external shareholder, EXT, 
alters the incentives’ effect on leverage. However, we see a trend indicating that when the 
largest shareholders are institutional, executives’ incentives obtain a higher effect on 
leverage. We also observe that the presence of a large external shareholder seems to affect 
leverage negatively. 
To evaluate how the size of a large external shareholder influences the incentives’ 
effect on leverage, we do regressions on samples restricted by whether or not the largest 
external shareholder holds more (SUBEL) or less (SUBES) than 10 %. Short et al. (2002) did a 
similar analysis and observed that when the firms’ largest external shareholder holds a high 
fraction, the incentives’ effect on debt level is reduced. As the equity incentive variables 
turned out to be insignificant in both of our samples, we cannot draw any conclusions about 
this (see Table 4).  
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To find out how different types of shareholders influence the incentives’ effect on 
leverage; we divide our sample into two groups, one with private, non-diversified 
shareholders (SUBEP) and one with institutional, well diversified shareholders (SUBEI). Since 
the average value of EXT in our sample is high, 24.6 % (see Table 2), both institutional and 
private shareholders hold a high fraction of the company, and hence should possess strong 
interests in the firms’ leverage policy. However, according to our definition regarding type of 
shareholder, institutional shareholders have more diversified investment portfolios than 
private shareholders do. It is therefore likely that the latter are more active in changing 
firms’ leverage policy, as they to a higher degree are dependent on the performance of each 
single firm. Therefore, we expect the equity incentives to be less efficient and EXT to be 
more efficient when regressing on the subset where only private shareholders are included 
(SUBEP). But, when doing this regression we get both insignificant coefficients on the 
incentive proxies and the EXT variable. We can therefore not draw any conclusion on this 
matter. This inconclusiveness might be due to the limited size of our sample, which makes it 
difficult to see any clear trends. When regressing on the subset including only institutional 
shareholders (SUBEI), we expect the incentives to be more efficient since the external 
shareholders will interfere less in firms financing policy. Therefore, we also expect EXT to be 
less efficient. In our results from regressing on SUBEI all incentive proxies, except VO, obtain 
higher coefficients and become increasingly statistically significant. It is though important to 
notice that the contradicting changes in VO’s coefficient, with respect to size and p-value, 
are minimal.  EXT gets clearly less influential and remains insignificant. For this reason, the 
incentives seem to have a stronger effect in SUBEI compared to the whole sample. 
Even though EXT seems to affect leverage negatively, we still see that EXT has 
different influential directions on leverage across the samples, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. 
Here, the negative coefficients are generally higher and much more significant. Our 
observation supports Short et al. (2002), while Firth (1995) and Mehran (1992) observe a 
positive relationship between the existence of a large external shareholder and the debt 
ratio.  
When regressing on the subsample where only external shareholders holding more 
than 10 % of firms’ stocks are included (SUBEL), EXT is positive and close to significant. In the 
opposite subsample (SUBES) it becomes strongly negative and clearly significant. If one of 
the subsamples consists of a higher proportion of diversified shareholders, this could have 
been an explanation for these contradicting influences. But, when regressing on a sample 
that only includes institutional shareholders (SUBEI), compared to one that only include 
private shareholders (SUBEP), we see that EXT’s coefficient becomes positive and non-
significant in both. Our suggested explanation does therefore not hold, and we find it 
difficult to give a reason for why the size of the largest external shareholders determines 
which direction these shareholders affect leverage.  
 
4 Robustness checks and potential sources of errors 
 
Throughout our analysis we have conducted tests to increase the robustness of our results 
and to locate errors. Below follows explanations of these tests, and a list of possible 
remaining errors. 
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4.1 Bootstrapping 
 
To check the accuracy of our sample estimates we conducted a robustness check, using 
bootstrapping. This technique allowed us to estimate the properties of our variables, with 
respect to the influential direction and order of magnitude (coefficient size). We defined 
coefficient values within the same decimal to have an equivalent order of magnitude. 
Bootstrapping was done by randomly selecting 15 firms, five times, from the whole sample, 
resulting in five different subsamples. The regression on each of the five subsamples was 
then compared to the regression on the whole sample to see if the results were consistent.  
In our regression, LNSALES has a negative and insignificant coefficient. When 
bootstrapping, the influential direction of LNSALES varied and none of the coefficients had 
the same order of magnitude as our model. We could therefore not draw any conclusions for 
this variable, but it did not weaken our model since the variable was insignificant in the first 
place. Both EOA and GROWRD have a positive coefficient, significant and insignificant 
respectively. This same result was found in all five subsamples when bootstrapping, making 
a stronger argument for the accuracy of our estimated coefficients for these variables. 
SS has a positive and fairly significant coefficient in the whole sample, which is also found 
when bootstrapping on all five subsamples. This strengthens our result for this coefficient. 
VSTO has a negative and significant coefficient in the whole sample. The results from 
bootstrapping gave the same influential direction. One coefficient was also significant and 
had the same order of magnitude. Besides this, all the other subsamples gave different order 
of magnitudes, but the coefficients were all insignificant. It is therefore difficult to draw a 
definite conclusion for this variable, but we see a clear negative trend. Both OS and VO have 
a negative and significant coefficient when bootstrapping, which is the same result as we 
found in the whole sample. In general, bootstrapping gave us basically the same result as our 
model and we thereby conclude that our model is reasonably robust. 
 
4.2 Internal validity 
 
When doing a regression one will never manage to capture a completely perfect picture. So 
even though we throughout our work have strived to minimize the chances of biases, there 
are still some possible sources of errors in our dataset that is worth to keep in mind when 
analyzing the results.  
Panel data is given as a solution to omitted variable bias when the omitted variables are 
constant over time within a given company. We believe that we have been able to capture 
all the variables that will have an influence on leverage over time, but we realize that there is 
always a possibility of missing out of a factor that can create bias if omitted in the regression 
model.  
Another reason for errors can be that we have chosen a linear approach.  We assume 
that an increase in the incentives given to executives will give in an analogous motivation of 
changing leverage, resulting in a linearly relationship. We therefore see this as the most 
suitable functional form, but there is always a chance that a non-linear polynomial or 
exponential model would be more appropriate to use. If that is the case, we will, by using a 
linear model, get somewhat biased results.  
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Omitted interaction terms could be another possible source of error.  We did, however, 
try to include interaction terms in our model, but this resulted in a less informative model. 
The interaction terms overlapped with the already defined variables and did not give 
anything extra to our analysis. We therefore found it best not to include them in our model.  
Some variables bias will be found in our results. One reason for this is the different 
reporting procedures among Nordic firms. Due to these differences we had to make some 
simplifications and approximations to be able to complete our dataset7. Another reason is 
that we only corrected for the differences in currencies once, at the end of each year, but we 
assume the effect of this to be negligible.  
To see if there was simultaneous causality between leverage and our independent 
variables, we looked at the correlation between the error term and the independent 
variables. This showed us that the correlation was too low to have a significant impact on 
our results. Nevertheless, it might, to some degree, be a two-way interaction between the 
incentives variables and leverage. 
Another possible source of errors is outliers in our dataset. After completing the data 
collection we plotted each year separately and removed firms that stood out in three or 
more years. Since our dataset was already fairly limited, we decided not to remove firms 
that had only one or two years with substantially differing observations. If our dataset were 
bigger we would probably also have removed these firms, and the decision might cause 
some bias in our results.  
As a last remark, we see that three out of four control variables are insignificant. This 
could be a sign that they fail to remain constant, but we believe that even though they are 
insignificant they could still capture an effect that improve our model. We therefore decided 
to include them in the regressions. This can create some bias, but we assumed it to be small. 
 
5. Conclusion and further work 
 
We have empirically investigated to what extent executive incentives can explain capital 
structure in Nordic firms. To answer this we have considered two incentives given to 
executives, stocks and options. In addition, we have seen how equity ownership by a large 
external shareholder influences the incentives effect on capital structure.  Our results show 
that executive options have a statistical and economical negative effect on the long term 
debt level, while stock holdings’ influence is more diffuse. We also found that for executives 
in Nordic firms, options give a stronger incentive to change leverage than stocks do. No 
significant dependency was found between the size of large external shareholders and the 
executive incentives’ effect on capital structure. Still, we saw a weak trend indicating that 
the effect of equity based incentives is stronger when the largest shareholders are 
institutional. Compared with earlier research within the area, our results from investigating 
Nordic firms coincide more with those found in the UK than those in the US.  
To get stronger indicia on how stock and option incentives affect leverage in the 
Nordic region, regressions can be done on a more comprehensive dataset.  
Another value-adding aspect would be to include the executives’ own time horizon 
regarding when to sell their equity or when to turn in their notice of dismissal. Especially, it 
would be interesting to evaluate if executives choose a higher leverage in firms when either 
                                                          
7
 See Appendix B for details. 
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of these time horizons are short. If this is the case it could indicate that equity incentives can 
make executives act opportunistic. Executives might be willing to take larger risks right 
before they plan to sell their equity, hoping to increase the short-term stock prices and 
thereby gaining more wealth. If the executives also are about to leave the company, they 
might take this larger risk even though they anticipate a reduced long-term firm 
performance, as this will not affect them.  
It would also have been interesting to look at how the financial crisis impacts the 
incentives’ effect on leverage. We did try to do some test that would reviled such influences, 
but did not get any significant results. We believe that in the future, with a prolonged 
dataset, such trends will probably be easier to discover. 
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APPENDIX A: Calculation of incentive variables 
 
SS:  Proxy for how sensitive the market value of equity held by executives is to change in 
the volatility of firm value 
 
 
                                 
where 
 
                         and      
   
 
 
        
 
 
     
    
 
 
 
 
    Sensitivity of compensation to asset return volatility (Vega) 
S  The market value of the firm, determined as the market value of equity plus 
the book value of total liabilities at year end. Using book values as proxies for 
market value of liabilities is common practice in the literature.  
K   Book value of total liabilities at year end 
N’  Probability density function for the normal distribution  
T  The liability’s time to maturity 
y  Dividend yield 
r  The riskless rate (Treasury bond rate with a time to maturity equal to 10 |
  years) 
      
   The variance in firm value 
 
 
 
σasset is found from σequity by assuming σliability=0
8 in the equation beneath. σequity is found each 
year by calculating the variance between each day’s stock payoff. 
 
       
      
                    
           
           
                    
           9 
 
 
 
OS:    Proxy for how sensitive executives’ option value is to change in the volatility of stock 
value. 
 
 
              
where 
 
                                                          
8
 Considering that our sample consists of well established, stock exchanged listed firms with a low average debt 
ratio; small liability volatility close to zero is a reasonable assumption. 
9
 We use market values, and assume that the market value of liabilities equals the book value of liabilities. 
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                          and     
   
 
 
        
 
 
     
    
 
 
 
 
    The sensitivity of compensation to stock return volatility (Vega) 
S  Current price of the stock 
K  Strike price of the option 
N’  Probability density function for the normal distribution  
T  Time to maturity 
r  The continuously compounded risk-free interest rate 
y  Dividend yield  
       
      The variance of the stock (Found each year by calculating the variance 
between each day’s stock payoffs)   
 
 
 
VSTO: Proxy defined by the ratio of stock incentives compensation to total monetary 
compensation. 
 
 
     
                            
                                           
 
 
 
 
VO: Proxy defined by the ratio of option incentives compensation to total monetary 
compensation. 
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APPENDIX B: Assumptions and simplifications in the dataset. 
 
When collecting information for the dataset several assumptions and simplifications had to 
be made. We found data in both Amadeus and Bloomberg and these numbers were not 
always identical. When this was the case, numbers from Amadeus was used.  
 
Due to different reporting methods in the annual reports, concerning financial information, 
we had to make the following assumptions: 
- Non-current liabilities are liabilities not due to be paid within the next year. 
Therefore, when long-term debt was not clearly expressed, non-current liability was 
used as an approximation. 
- Revenue is income that a company receives from its normal business activities, 
usually from sale of goods and services to customers. Since a large proportion of 
sales often constitute the same part, we have used revenue as an approximation for 
sales when numbers for sales were missing. 
- There were some of the companies that reported unequal financial statement 
numbers for the same year in two different annual reports. When this occurred the 
latest accounting numbers where used.  
 
In this paper only executives’ incentives, and not the total incentives given in a company, 
were included. Since some companies only reported total incentives given, some 
simplifications were made: 
- If the exercise price and maturity date where not explicitly given for the executives 
incentives, we used the information appurtenant to the total number of options 
allocated in the firm as an approximation. 
- Where the exercise price was only given for the options exercised in the current 
period, we used this price to indicate the exercise price for all outstanding options.  
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APPENDIX C: Other regression results 
Table 5-7 below show that lags on the OS and VO variables are insignificant. Even though 
they are insignificant they could still capture an effect that improves our model.  As shown in 
Table 5 we have a small time trend in our dataset, and we therefore believe that lags will 
create value for our analysis and decided to include them in the regressions. 
 
C.1 Two regressions to establish the existence of a time trend  
 
 Whole dataset Years 2007-2009 Whole dataset Years 2007-2009 
LEV COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. 
LNSALES -0.0025 -0.0020 -0.0033 0. 0042 
 (0.878) (0.902) (0.840) (0.793) 
EOA 0.3845 0.3797 0.3938 0. 3933 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWRD 0.1336 0. 1347 0.1563 0. 1391 
 (0.386) (0.374) (0.306) (0.346) 
EXT 0.1327 0. 1304 0.0907 0. 1047 
 (0.321) (0.321) (0.495) (0.416) 
SS
1
 1.65E-04 1.68E-04   
 (0.133) (0.122)   
OS
1
 -0.0010 -0.0011   
 (0.008) (0.003)   
VSTO
2
   -0.0017 -0. 0018 
   (0.063) (0.043) 
VO
2
   -0.0348 -0. 0344 
   (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Lags OS
1
     
L1 0.0002    
 (0.659)    
L2 0.0002    
 (0.898)    
     
Lags VO
2
     
L1   0.0021  
   (0.663)  
L2   -0.0021  
   (0.553)  
Table 5:  Regression with lags done on the whole sample, compared to the regression done only on years 
2007-2009. This was done to registrate time effect in our dataset.  
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C.2 Table 3 with lags 
 
 Whole dataset SUBO Whole dataset SUBO 
LEV COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. 
LNSALES -0.0025 -0.0066 -0.0033 -0.0034 
 (0.878) (0.722) (0.840) (0.849) 
EOA 0.3845 -0.1838 0.3938 -0.2235 
 (0.000) (0.365) (0.000) (0.294) 
GROWRD 0.1336 -0.2122 0.1563 -0.3045 
 (0.386) (0.599) (0.306) (0.432) 
EXT 0.1327 -0.3394 0.0907 -0.2700 
 (0.321) (0.106) (0.495) (0.210) 
SS
1
 1.65E-04 2.3E-04   
 (0.133) (0.019)   
OS
1
 -0.0010 -0.0010   
 (0.008) (0.002)   
VSTO
2
   -0.0017 -0.0003 
   (0.063) (0.895) 
VO
2
   -0.0348 -0.0263 
   (0.001) (0.014) 
     
Lags OS
1
     
L1 0.0002 -4.9E-05   
 (0.659) (0.878)   
L2 0.0002 -0.0005   
 (0.898) (0.674)   
     
Lags VO
2
     
L1   0.0021 0.0046 
   (0.663) (0.394) 
L2   -0.0021 -0.0007 
   (0.553) (0.870) 
Table 6:  Same regressions as in Table 3, but lags are included. Coefficients, with accompanying p-values 
in brackets, are provided for the different regressions. 
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C.3 Table 4 with lags 
 
 SUBES SUBEL SUBES SUBEL SUBEP SUBEI SUBEP SUBEI 
LEV COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. COEF. 
LNSALES -0.0301 0.0068 -0.0263 0.0042 0.0146 -0.0143 0.0369 -0.0085 
 (0.032) (0.713) (0.090) (0.820) (0.797) (0.464) (0.348) (0.655) 
EOA 0.1008 0.1410 0.1837 0.1435 0.2809 0.4605 0.1381 0.4560 
 (0.819) (0.024) (0.719) (0.022) (0.146) (0.000) (0.335) (0.000) 
GROWRD -1.9149 0.1189 -1.6856 0.1071 -0.2032 0.1367 0.2509 0.1587 
 (0.000) (0.506) (0.000) (0.550) (0.633) (0.475) (0.567) (0.404) 
EXT -4.8356 0.1799 -5.4252 0.1789 0.0597 0.0692 0.3904 0.0585 
 (0.001) (0.199) (0.000) (0.207) (0.885) (0.680) (0.235) (0.723) 
SS
1
 1.58E-03 0.0002   -4.60E-06 0.0002   
 (0.353) (0.210)   (0.987) (0.073)   
OS
1
 0.0013 -0.0006   0.0012 -0.0010   
 (0.549) (0.127)   (0.851) (0.007)   
VSTO
2
   -0.0032 -0.0005   0.0016 -0.0021 
   (0.380) (0.331)   (0.514) (0.037) 
VO
2
   -0.0005 -0.0055   -0.0214 -0.0339 
   (0.905) (0.304)   (0.802) (0.002) 
         
Lags OS
1
         
L1     0.0045 0.0001   
     (0.256) (0.728)   
L2     0.0006 0.0004   
     (0.869) (0.834)   
         
Lags VO
2
         
L1       0.0789 0.0017 
       (0.315) (0.736) 
L2       -0.0625 -0.0013 
       (0.288) (0.720) 
Table 7: Same regressions as in Table 4, but lags are included. Coefficients, with accompanying p- values in 
brackets, are provided for the different regressions. 
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C.4 Regression including equity owned by executive 
 
 Whole dataset SUBO 
LEV COEF. COEF. 
LNSALES 0.0109 -0.0003 
 (0.485) (0.976) 
EOA 0.1304 -0.274 
 (0.024) (0.045) 
GROWRD 0.1358 -0.296 
 (0.373) (0.109) 
EXT 0.1896 -0.196 
 (0.114) (0.135) 
MANFRAC 0.023  -0.276 
  (0.938) (0.320)  
Table 8: Results when including fractions hold by executive 
in the regression. Coefficients, with accompanying p-values 
in brackets, are provided for the different regressions. 
 
